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1. Negotiating Meanings 
James Gee proposes that discourse analysis could work as a bridge between cultures and 
enhance understanding. He makes very important points in his paper, specifically in respect to 
the interpretation and understanding of contested meanings; and about the different 
conceptual systems governing different world views and influencing perception and dialogue. 
More specifically, he emphasizes the relevance of context, i.e. situational meanings (by drawing 
on Williams 1991): 
“Semantics lives in language as a system. Situational meanings live in the world. The 
bridge between the two is negotiation, contestation, discussion, communal agreement 
or disagreements over what is sufficiently like what to count as having a given word 
applied to it” (pp. XXX). 
This insight which has widely been accepted and acknowledged in the field of Pragmatics ever 
since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s seminal Philosophical Investigations (1967[1953]) implies that no 
fixed meanings exist; meanings are always open to discussion, contestation, and dialogue. 
Indeed, the entire development of the fields of Pragmatics and Sociolinguistics as well as 
Discourse Studies can be traced back to Wittgenstein’s assumptions and their elaboration by 
various different philosophers and linguists (e.g., Angermuller et al. 2014; Culpeper et al. 2009; 
Wodak 1996). 
Furthermore, Gee also poses the question about how people would or could settle their 
arguments if discourse/dialogue is not possible (p. XXX). Unfortunately, as he states, frequently 
not via argumentation but through “hate, war intolerance, and withdrawing into meaning 
ghettos” (ibid.). In other words: if people (groups, political parties, and so forth) remain 
dogmatic and cultivate their fundamentalist beliefs and ideologies (and related meanings), then 
any understanding, any negotiation or co-construction of meanings will become impossible. This 
leads us to much existing work on argumentation and deliberation as well as on cognitive frame 
theory or even conflict and peace research, i.e. on political communication (e.g., Amossy 2002; 
Habermas 1992; Forchtner 2016; Hansson 2015; Lakoff 2004; Musolff 2010; Van Eemeren 
2008). In this context, Gee’s concept of a socially-derived framework (“of how to think about 
certain things” (p. XXX) becomes relevant. Gee defines such frameworks as a “type of social and 
cultural theory.” (p. XXX) Here, I am immediately reminded of Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive 
approach and his notions of context models and epistemic communities (Van Dijk 2007, 2008) 
as well as of Aristotle’s important term ‘endoxon’ (Boukala 2016).  
Aristotle uses the concept of endoxon in order to describe an opinion that can be accepted by 
the majority of people in any society, because it represents traditional knowledge but not 
necessarily true knowledge. Accordingly, van Eemeren (2010, 111) also claims that endoxa are 
defined as commonly held beliefs or generally accepted commitments. This approach supports 
Habermas' thesis (1992) that legal systems must ultimately always be grounded in moral 
systems, and that formal procedural law, having cut its connections with sacred law and its 
larger religious context, was forced to let morality in again through the back door, to shape 
whatever room for interpretation was left – the more so, the more law in fact became an 
instrument of governmental control. 
Obviously, nobody acts on the basis of a tabula rasa, everybody has been socialized into 
knowledge communities and communities of practice; and everybody always carries specific 
expectations into every speech situation with them (Wodak 2011). Thus, it would be – and here 
I totally agree with Gee’s appeal – really important to make such expectations explicit in order 
to understand each other’s background and positioning, and to possibly make compromises 
between each other’s frameworks.  
In order to succeed in such an endeavor, people, however, would have to be willing to learn, to 
accommodate or even change and modify their views – which takes us to theories of learning 
(Wodak 2006; see below). However, if people (for example, teachers in Gee’s paper, p. XXX) are 
not willing to learn or are “trapped into their frameworks”, learning and subsequent dialogue 
become impossible. In such cases, people only hear and understand what they want to hear or 
understand; every new piece of information is used to support their already existing points of 
view. In politics, we frequently encounter such situations: politicians do not listen to each other; 
they actually don’t seem to want to listen to each other, parallel worlds clash with each other 
and no understanding can be achieved. 
2. Learning and Power 
Generally speaking, Gee offers a vision of a world where people want to understand each other 
and make their socio-cultural frameworks explicit. In other words, a world where exchange, 
negotiation, deliberation, dialogue and compromise would be desirable and achievable. Such an 
imaginary presupposes, I believe, contexts where power relations would also be made explicit 
and hence, ‘true’ learning would become possible. However, Gee does not discuss power 
relations and structural conditions and constraints in any detail. Gee offers us an interesting 
example of learning and claims that goodwill is necessary to engage in critical discussion. 
Goodwill would imply – as mentioned above – the willingness to compromise and to challenge 
one’s own belief systems. However, structural constraints and power relations also have to be 
considered. Thus, in the following, I briefly add some considerations on the notions of power 
and learning. 
 
Discourse theorists of Foucauldian governmentality studies, hegemony analysis (Laclau) or 
psychoanalysis (Lacan) assume that both power and subjectivity shape and are shaped by 
discursive practices. Indeed, society and its actors, social inequality and its agents, symbolic and 
cultural orders and their subjects are no givens; they are made and unmade in discursive 
practices. In this sense, discourse does not only represent what people do, think and are in the 
social world; representing the world can also mean constituting it in a certain way (Angermuller 
et al. 2014). At the same time, discursive practices testify to the intricate relationship of power 
and subjectivity. Who is entitled to say what from which position and with what effect is 
discursively regulated: not everybody has the same chance to become visible and exist as a 
subject, to participate in the exchange with others and thus to shape what counts as reality in a 
community.  
 
Typically, critical sociolinguistics and discourse studies are interested in the way discourse 
(re)produces social domination, i.e. power abuse by one group over others, and how dominated 
groups may discursively resist such abuse. Gramsci’s observation that the maintenance of 
contemporary power rests not only on coercive force but also on ‘hegemony’ (winning the 
consent of the majority) has been particularly influential. The emphasis on hegemony entails an 
emphasis on ideology, and on how the structures and practices of ordinary life routinely 
normalize capitalist social relations. Althusser (1971) made a major contribution to the theory of 
ideology, demonstrating how these are linked to material practices embedded in social 
institutions (e.g. school teaching). He also showed their capacity to position people as social 
‘subjects’, although he tended toward an overly deterministic (structuralist) version of this 
process which left little room for action by subjects (Fairclough et al. 2011). Lukes (2005, 28) 
emphasises the ideological dimensions of power (relations):  
 
“Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, 
either because they see it as natural and interchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial?”  
Foucault primarily focuses on “technologies of power”: discipline is a complex bundle of power 
technologies developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Power is thus 
exercised with intention – but it is not individual intention. Foucault relies on what is accepted 
knowledge about how to exercise power (Jäger & Maier 2015). He recommends an analysis of 
power with a rather functionalist strategy: in his historical analysis in Surveiller et Punir 
(Foucault 1975), Foucault raises questions concerning the social functions and effects of 
different technologies of surveillance and punishment: How do things work at the level of 
ongoing subjugation, at the level of those continuous processes which subject our bodies, 
govern our gestures, and dictate our behaviour? 
In every text (written, oral, visual), discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by 
differences in power that are, in part, encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. 
Therefore texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and 
ideologies contending and struggling for dominance. It becomes apparent that communication 
is always governed by more or less subtle or explicit power relations. Thus, any proposals for 
mutual understanding or “building bridges” would necessarily have to consider power 
structures and how to cope with these in dialogue. 
Let us now approach the concepts of understanding and learning which have both, of course, 
been the subject of huge philosophical, sociological, political science, and linguistic literatures: 
Forchtner (2011) elaborates the weak but unavoidable, pragmatic presuppositions of 
communication oriented towards understanding as reconstructed in Jürgen Habermas’ work. 
These presuppositions are viewed by Habermas (2008, 28) in terms of  
 
“a world of independently existing objects, the reciprocal presupposition of rationality or 
‘accountability’, the unconditionality of context-transcending validity claims such as 
truth and moral rightness, and the demanding presuppositions of argumentation”.  
 
The latter are particularly significant and need to be counterfactually assumed in 
communication oriented towards mutual understanding (including equal communicative rights, 
sincerity and freedom from repression and manipulation) (Forchtner & Wodak 2017).  
Much recent interdisciplinary work on political argumentation draws on Habermas’s seminal 
Theory of Communicative Action (1984). Habermas’s critical approach proposes that two 
parties, should they want to reach agreement or consensus, have to satisfy a set of so-called 
“validity claims.” These claims imply that the speakers have to make their utterances 
“intelligible” (or “comprehensible”), “true and truthful,” and “right.” Truth claims refer to the 
objective world being true or false (e.g., “I hereby say that the milk is spilt”); rightness claims 
refer to social actions being right or wrong (e.g., “I hereby declare that killing is wrong”); 
truthfulness claims refer to the degree of sincerity in our self-representation (e.g., “I hereby 
promise to return the book”). Another important concept draws inherently on Habermas’s 
political philosophy: the concept of “deliberation.”  
For Habermas, in contrast to Fischer and Gottweis (2012), deliberation does not necessarily 
equal argumentation. Deliberation can be understood as the public use of reason as inclusively 
as possible. Deliberation is rational to the extent that claims are exchanged in an egalitarian, 
inclusive, and discursive context. Thus, Reisigl and Wodak (2001,34) drawing on Habermas’s 
emancipatory model, define “deliberative democracy” as “based on a free public sphere and a 
strong civil society, in which all concerned with the specific social problem in question can 
participate. … This model of democracy […] is also a theory of rational argumentation […] and 
discursive conflict solving.” 
Forchtner and Schneickert (2016) have further elaborated this line of thinking: the authors draw 
on work inspired by Habermas in which the idea of learning processes and their blocking has 
been conceptualized. For example, Miller (2006) offers a four-dimensional conceptualization of 
blocked learning. Such blockage of interaction could be caused by an existing consensus or a 
disagreement which cannot be challenged due to references to an authority, be it an 
individual/corporate actor or an idea/institution. Dogmatic learning leads to consensus, which is 
not challenged because of legitimizing references to an individual or corporate actor. Defensive 
learning views collectively shared knowledge and practices by a group as protected from 
criticism through reference to a particular idea or institution. Regressive learning excludes the 
other per se (for example through an argumentum ad hominem) from those who decide what is 
collectively shared. Ideological learning claims the existence of a fundamental 
antagonism/disagreement, which cannot be challenged by a certain idea. Forchtner and 
Schneickert (2016) offer manifold examples of these learning pathologies (which cannot be 
summarized here due to reasons of space); suffice to mention, however, that they analyze 
ideological learning in much detail by deconstructing various documents formally used in Higher 
Education in the former German Democratic Republic (ibid, 303).  
 
Forchtner (2016) combines a Habermasian perspective with a narrative approach, by arguing 
that modes of emplotting stories (that is, the selective arrangement of events as melodramatic, 
tragic, comic or ironic) provide a more realistic dimension to assess intersubjective relations 
(and could thus also be used for an application of Gee’s endeavor). Forchtner focusses on the 
ways actors, events, objects and processes feature in a narrative, and the expectations, emotive 
states and levels of certainty and self-righteousness of more or less self-critical subjects, which 
emerge from these stories. Melodramatic stories usually depict the world as being divided into 
dichotomies (good and bad), with the main protagonist of the story (with whom the audience is 
asked to identify) standing on “the right side”. Comedies too, though less clear-cut, offer 
reassurance to the subject (indeed, they offer a happy ending) and thus, there is little reason for 
self-critique (see also the notions of “fictionalization of politics” and the “politicization of 
fiction”: Wodak 2010, 2011). One of the examples analyzed by Forchtner concerns Habermas 
and Derrida’s famous manifesto (2003) which, as he maintains, is characterized by strong comic 
elements, such as rebirth, reconciliation and a happy ending (Forchtner 2016). Other people can 
be criticized as lacking experience and having not learnt, thus facilitating self-righteousness and 
closure. 
 
3. “East and West” 
In a joint paper in 2010, Paul Chilton, Hailong Tian and I discussed the different traditions and 
meanings associated with the notion of “critique” in “the East” and “West” (Chilton et al. 2010). 
This was not an easy or straight forward undertaking as many dimensions had to be taken into 
account.  
Firstly, we challenged the alleged dichotomy between East and West as such a dichotomy would 
presuppose two quasi homogenous static geographical entities characterized by distinct and 
observable differences. This is not the case as obviously no homogenous societies exist. Quite in 
contrast, both the Eastern and Western worlds have undergone manifold historical socio-
political and cultural developments, terrible wars and revolutions, and different philosophical, 
political, and ideological changes. Indeed, also within nation states, there exist no homogenous 
societies or cultures. As apparent from decades-long sociolinguistic research, even linguistic 
variation is constitutive for every society. Hence, whenever we talk about East and West, we 
actually – I believe – reproduce orientalist and colonialist belief systems. Obviously, it is 
important to study socio-political change, both on a macro- and on a micro-level. We can 
distinguish, on the one hand, tendencies of change over long periods (such as described by 
Fairclough 1992); and, on the other hand, we can trace shifts on a local, regional or national 
micro-level, in context-dependent ways (Rheindorf & Wodak 2016). 
Secondly, it is important to consider developments of power and power struggles. These also 
affect ideologies and belief systems, thus also what Gee labels as socio-cultural frameworks. 
Some frameworks are regarded as more adequate for specific contexts than others, by specific 
authorities, experts and politicians, i.e. those in power. This structural condition necessarily 
affects struggles over meaning, in all heterogeneous complex societies. This is why we stated in 
our paper that critique and reflection, i.e. not taking anything for granted, are relevant in order 
to deconstruct and understand meanings, to understand the presuppositions, implicatures and 
endoxa in each context. Moreover, the normative stance and position, the specific stories and 
values which subjects endorse should be made explicit, challenged and reflected.  
Thirdly, by reflecting on the notions of critique, deliberation, and ethics, we concluded that  
“Being “critical” in Western CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis] does, then, imply ethical 
value judgments concerning what is “the good life”, and these fundamental premises in 
all CDA work are not always overt. What this implies is a rather open-ended need to 
incorporate philosophical reflection into the underlying social, political and ethical 
premises of CDA, which may actually be independent of language and discourse.“ 
(Chilton et al. 2010, 25). 
This is certainly true both globally and locally. Intellectual perspectives and traditions meet one 
another, in various local, regional, national, and transnational contexts, at differing points in 
time. Here, we could return to Gee’s proposal that “interpretation of words and cultural 
frameworks – in and across science, politics, religion, society, institutions, and cultures – is a job 
for everyone with goodwill” (pp. XXX). I am convinced that we have enough theories, 
methodologies, and tools to conduct such “jobs” (and don’t require new approaches or labels); 
however, such endeavors remain abstract if one does not consider, reflect, and challenge the 
normative frameworks on which one draws and which one would like to propose and discuss, as 
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